But Thomas Aquinas is also a theorist of natural law. According to him, a human law (that is, what is proclaimed by men) is valid only to the extent that its content corresponds to the content of the natural law; As Thomas Aquinas says, “Human law has as much of the nature of law as natural law. But if it departs from the natural law in any respect, it is no longer a law, but a perversion of the law” (ST. I-II, Q.95, A.II). To paraphrase Augustine`s famous remark, an unjust law is really not a law at all. In 2018-2019, more than 64% of children with disabilities spend 80% or more of their school day in general education classes (IDEA Part B Child Count and Educational Environments Collection), and early intervention services are provided to more than 400,000 infants and young children with disabilities and their families (IDEA Part C Child Count and Settings). Empirically, many moral theorists of natural law are also theorists of natural law, but the two theories are, strictly speaking, logically independent. One can deny the theory of natural law, but advocate a theory of morality of natural law. John Austin, the most influential of the early legal positivists, for example, denied the overlap thesis but advocated something similar to an ethical theory of natural law. According to Dworkin, while lawmakers can legally enact laws that are justified by political arguments, courts cannot pursue such arguments when deciding cases. For a consequentialist argument of politics can never provide sufficient justification to decide the legal claim of one party and against the legal claim of another party. According to Dworkin, the invocation of an already existing right can ultimately only be justified by an argument of principle.
Thus, to the extent that judicial decisions necessarily rule on legal claims, they must ultimately be based on moral principles that contribute to the best justification of legal practice as a whole. Finnis` theory as a theory of law is certainly more plausible than the traditional interpretation of classical naturalism, but such plausibility comes at the expense of naturalism`s identity as a distinct legal theory. In fact, Finnis` theory of natural law seems compatible with the historical opponent of naturalism, legal positivism, insofar as Finnis` view is compatible with a source-based theory of legal validity; Laws that are technically valid but unfair because of the source do not fully bind the citizen, according to Finnis. In fact, Finnis (1996) believes that the classical naturalism of Thomas Aquinas fully confirms the notion that human laws are “postulated”. Intellectual property law deals with laws protecting and enforcing the rights of creators and owners of inventions, writings, music, designs and other works called “intellectual property”. There are several areas of intellectual property, including copyright, trademarks, patents and trade secrets. The strongest construction of the overlap thesis forms the basis of the classical naturalism of Thomas Aquinas and Blackstone. Thomas Aquinas distinguishes four types of laws: (1) the eternal law; (2) Natural law; (3) human rights; and (4) God`s law. The eternal law consists of the laws that govern the nature of an eternal universe; As Susan Dimock (1999, 22) puts it, “the eternal law can be imagined as encompassing all those who are scientific (physical, chemical, biological, psychological, etc.).” Laws by which the universe is ordered. God`s law deals with the standards that a person must meet in order to attain eternal salvation. Divine law cannot be discovered by natural reason alone; The commandments of God`s law are revealed only through divine revelation.
Dworkin rejects the thesis of positivism on social facts on the grounds that there are certain legal norms whose authority cannot be explained in terms of social facts. When deciding difficult cases, for example, judges often invoke moral principles that, according to Dworkin, do not derive their legal authority from the social criteria of legality contained in a rule of recognition (Dworkin 1977, 40). Patent law protects new inventions, which may be products, processes or designs, and provides a mechanism to protect the invention. The Patent Act encourages the exchange of new developments with others in order to promote innovation. The patent owner has the right to protect others against the manufacture, use, distribution or importation of the protected subject matter. Essentially, a patent is an intellectual property right that can be licensed, sold, pledged or assigned. The only formula that could be called the definition of law in these writings is now well known: law is the enterprise of subjecting human behavior to the rule of rules. Unlike most modern legal theories, this view treats law as an activity and views a legal system as the product of an ongoing goal-oriented effort (Fuller 1964, 106). Note that Dworkin`s views on legal principles and legal obligations do not conform to the three fundamental obligations of legal positivism.
Each contradicts the thesis of conventionality insofar as judges are obliged to interpret the postulated law in the light of unstated moral principles. Each contradicts the thesis of the social fact because these moral principles are considered part of the law of a community, whether they have been officially proclaimed or not. More importantly, Dworkin`s view contradicts the separability thesis in that it seems to imply that certain norms are necessarily valid because of their moral content. It is his thesis of the denial of separability that places Dworkin in the camp of naturalists. Again, it must be emphasized that Finnis is careful to deny that there is a necessary moral test of legal validity: “My view of the nature and purpose of explanatory definitions of theoretical concepts would simply be misunderstood if one were to assume that my definition `excludes as non-laws` laws that are not or not fully fulfilled, one or another element of the definition” (Finnis, 1980, p. 278). [T]he judges should decide difficult cases by interpreting the political structure of their community in the following way, perhaps in particular: by trying to find the best justification they can find in the principles of political morality for the structure as a whole, from the deepest constitutional rules and agreements to the details, for example, private law of tort or contract (Dworkin 1982, 165). In “Hard Cases,” Dworkin distinguishes between two types of legal arguments. Political arguments “justify a political decision by showing that the decision promotes or protects a collective goal of the community as a whole” (Dworkin 1977, 82).
In contrast, principled arguments “justify a political decision by showing that the decision respects or guarantees an individual or collective right” (Dworkin 1977, 82). International law deals only with matters of rights between several nations or nations and citizens or subjects of other nations. Private international law, on the other hand, deals with controversies between individuals. These controversies arise from situations that have a significant relationship with several nations. In recent years, the line between public law and private international law has become increasingly blurred. Private international law issues may also concern issues of international law, and many private international law issues are of considerable international importance. For this reason, Dworkin argues that a judge should strive to interpret a case along the following lines: According to the legal theory of natural law, the authority of legal norms necessarily derives at least in part from considerations related to the moral value of those norms.
